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 In this paper, we address the geographic distribution of sales of some of the world’s largest 
multinational enterprises (MNEs), with a focus on the share of each leg of the ‘Triad’ (the North-
American Free Trade Agreement or NAFTA-zone, the European Union - E.U., and Asia) in 
these firms’ overall sales. Our view is that a firm has achieved global corporate success only if it 
is able to earn a balanced regional distribution of sales. Only high actual sales across the globe, 
especially in the wealthy and technologically advanced triad regions, demonstrate both strong 
firm-level capabilities at the supply side to market products and services worldwide, and a high 
willingness of sophisticated consumers at the demand side, to pay for the firm’s output. With 
respect to the supply side, we develop a new conceptual framework, which distinguishes among 
the global, regional and national loci of MNE decision-making, as well as the global, regional 
and national levels of product standardization. Our main point is that the regional dimension is 
important for many firms, because it is a geographic level where many important decisions are 
made, and where product standardization may be appropriate. We then identify the twenty MNEs 
with the highest foreign-to-total (F/T) sales ratios in the UNCTAD list of most internationalized 
companies in terms of foreign asset base that are also Fortune 500 firms. For this set of large, 
highly internationalized companies, we measure the distribution of their sales across triad 
regions. We find that only three of these firms actually have a substantial portion of their sales 
across all three legs of the triad. The other MNEs are either bi-regional, host-region oriented or 
home-triad region oriented. In other words, the empirical evidence reveals that even these highly 





on this empirical finding by investigating whether a regional component can be identified in 
twelve specific cases of MNE strategy, building upon our new framework.  
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The theme of this paper is that, even today, many of the most internationalized MNEs have a 
limited geographic scope of their sales. The new thinking explored in this paper is the extent to 
which these MNEs are ‘home-region’ based, in terms of sales, in the spirit of Rugman (2000) and 
Rugman and Verbeke (2004). Examples will be examined of large, highly internationalized MNEs, 
from several industries. The paper provides empirical evidence that the majority of even the most 
internationalized MNEs in reality have a limited geographic distribution of their sales. Of the 
world’s 20 MNEs with the highest asset-based internationalization of their activities, only three can 
be considered candidates for the status of global firm; the remainder have a more narrow scope of 
their sales, and are therefore uni-regional or bi-regional, when measured on the sales distribution 
criterion, which we consider the ultimate proxy for global competitive success, as this requires both 
supply side efficiency and effective market penetration. 
 
A Framework of Triad/Regional Business Activity 
Figure 1 presents a framework that distinguishes among global, regional and national strategy 
components for MNEs with highly internationalized sales, assets and/or employees (as measured by 
the relative size of each foreign component vis-à-vis the sum of domestic and foreign components). 
The vertical axis represents the actual product characteristics (ex post) of an MNE at these three 





 The extent to which products are standardized at the global, regional or national level 
represents the ‘revealed preferences’ of MNEs to institutionalize a particular approach at the world 
scale or to adapt to the requirements of national/regional markets. In contrast, the horizontal axis is 
more a reflection of ‘stated preferences’, i.e., the extent to which MNE managers view strategic 
decision making as a process concentrated in one home base or dispersed across regions or 
countries.  
More specifically, the horizontal axis represents the location of decision-making power (ex 
ante) for corporate, business or functional strategy issues. Here, the question to be answered is 
whether all of the MNE’s key strategic decisions (e.g., choice of product/market niches, choice of 
strategic management tools to outperform rivals, key decisions made in each functional area, 
including R&D, production, marketing, distribution, human resources management), are taken in a 
single location, or whether at least a substantial portion of these decisions is taken in several ‘home 
bases’ at the national or regional levels.  
Figure 1 is an adaptation of Rugman and Verbeke’s (1993) framework on ‘global’ strategies. 
They argued that the truly important decisions to be taken by MNEs are related to two parameters. 
First, the number of home bases with which they function, i.e., the number of locations where 
important strategic decisions are taken (equivalent to the horizontal axis of Figure 1, where the 
number of home bases determines strategic decision making). Second, the use of non-location 
bound versus location bound firm specific advantages (FSAs), (equivalent to the vertical axis of 
Figure 1, whereby the nature of the MNE’s FSAs determines its product offering). The non-location 
bound FSAs allow various approaches to standardize the MNE’s product offering across borders 
and to earn benefits of integration (related to scale, scope and benefits of exploiting national 





provide the potential to gain benefits of national responsiveness; this outcome is represented by the 
bottom of the vertical axis. In addition, the regional component, in the middle of the vertical axis 
represents either the limited geographic deployability and exploitation potential of non-location-
bound FSAs, or the fine-tuning of location bound FSAs, in order to achieve benefits of more region-
based, rather than merely nation-based responsiveness.  
The difference with Rugman and Verbeke’s (1993) resource-based perspective on the 
integration-national responsiveness model is thus that Figure 1 explicitly introduces a regional 
dimension to the analysis. This is now needed due to the emerging empirical work, Rugman (2000) 
and Rugman and Verbeke (2004), which suggests that normative messages, advocating simple 
global strategies are not appropriate for most MNEs, which actually operate on a triad/regional 
basis. More specifically, on the horizontal axis this regional dimension implies that a number of 
strategic decisions are left to region-based headquarters, rather than nation-based ones, Enright 
(2004a) and (2004b). The vertical axis implies the development of FSAs useful at the level of the 
set of nations that form the region. These are region-bound company strengths: they can contribute 
to survival, profitability and growth beyond the geographic scope of a single nation, but these such 
strengths are still location bound, in the sense that they cannot be deployed globally, see Morrison, 
Ricks and Roth (1991), Morrison and Roth (1992), Delios and Beamish (2004), Grosse (2004), Li 
(2004), Yin and Choi (2004) for related analyses. In this context, Yip’s (2003, p. 7) view that a 
global company: “has the capability to go anywhere, deploy any assets, and access any resources, 
and it maximizes profits on a global basis” may be an appealing normative message, but one that 
applies to very few, if any, MNEs in practice. Indeed, most MNEs rely largely on sets of location-
bound (in the sense of nation-bound) and region-bound FSAs as the basis for their competitiveness. 





Figure 1 helps identify the variety of strategic options available to highly internationalized 
MNEs, as a foundation of global corporate success, in the sense of a balanced distribution of sales 
across the triad. Few cases, if any, exist of firms solely positioned in cell 1, where all decisions are 
taken centrally, and products are not adapted to host countries and regions. In practice, a substantial 
portion of decision-making may be concentrated in the left column of Figure 1, as is the case with 
most key financial decisions in MNEs, which are taken by the CEO and top management committee 
at that level. However, even if most major corporate strategy decisions are taken centrally, typically 
in the home country (left column of Figure 1), as is the case for many companies in, e.g., the 
computer business (both hardware and software), cells 2 and 3 reflect the existence of respectively 
substantial regional and national responsiveness regarding the product offering (including its service 
component) that actually is provided to the market.  
In other words, MNEs that tailor their product offering to regional and national 
circumstances do not pursue a simple global strategy as suggested by cell 1. Considerable resources 
must be allocated to allow for the required level of sub-global responsiveness in terms of what is 
being delivered to the market. In addition, even if the MNE’s product offerings were largely global 
(top row of Figure 1), this does not necessarily imply that all, important decisions on market 
penetration, distribution, advertising etc. can be taken centrally. Bounded rationality constraints are 
likely to force corporate management to delegate important decisions to the regional and national 
levels, thereby positioning the firm closer to cells 4 and 7.  
This point is vitally important from a policy-perspective, as many anti-globalization critics 
suffer from an important misperception:  they view MNEs as centrally directed, profit maximizing 
entities, eager to sell standardized products around the globe. Anti-globalization critics state that 





governments. In fact, the presence of intense international rivalry and the unfortunate reality that 
every MNE from one region does face an important liability of foreignness in the other regions of 
the world, forces MNEs to be particularly sensitive to the requirements of host-country 
governments and other salient stakeholders, Rugman and Verbeke (1998).  
 Of course, this does not imply that MNEs can or should adopt an approach in cell 9, and be 
fully polycentric, with products carefully tailored to each national market and most strategy 
decisions left to host-country subsidiary managers. Much conceptual and empirical evidence 
suggests that a ‘multi-national’ approach leads to overlapping efforts and duplication in innovation, 
inconsistent national strategies, opportunistic behavior by subsidiary managers, and more generally, 
a waste of resources and lack of clear strategic direction, Bartlett and Ghoshal (2000). The great 
strength of an MNE is to overcome market imperfections characterizing national markets and to 
develop systemic, network-related rather than asset based FSAs, see Dunning and Rugman (1985). 
Even for MNEs with a polycentric administrative heritage, cells 6 and 8 are likely much more 
relevant than cell 9. In cell 6, attempts are made to achieve decision-making synergies across 
markets, e.g., by developing pan-European or pan-American strategies in particular functional 
areas, Rugman and Verbeke (1992). In cell 8, economies of scale and scope are pursued by the 
national subsidiary managers themselves, through standardizing at the regional level their product 
offering across those national markets that have strong similarities in demand. In that case, 
subsidiary initiative is critical, Birkinshaw (2000), Rugman and Verbeke (2001). 
  The strategy and international management literature has done a good job of distinguishing 
between cells 1 and 9, but it has usually not addressed explicitly most of the other cells. For 
example, the stylized matrix of integration (cell 1) and national responsiveness (cell 9) popularized 





local’ national responsiveness strategy of cell 9. In addition, the key contribution of their 
‘transnational solution’ framework was the prescription that MNEs should usefully combine 
strategies in cells 1 and 9. They should attempt to develop appropriate strategies for each separate 
business, for each function within that business, and for each task within that function, the 
capability to implement either a national or a global approach.  
  The Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) framework thus can usefully explain cell 3 (centralized, 
global strategic decision making combined with local product offering), i.e., the global think-local 
act approach. It also allows the analysis of less common cases in cell 7, whereby rather powerful 
national subsidiaries are responsible for delivering global products, but choose themselves which 
products have the most potential in their national markets and largely take responsibility for the 
delivery, an approach found in many global professional services companies. Yet, their framework 
cannot handle cell 5, triad-based strategies very well, nor the intermediate cases of cells 2, 4, 6, and 
8, i.e., all cases whereby the regional level is important.  
  The present paper reports data suggesting that an increasing number of MNEs operates 
largely at the regional level. Therefore regional elements are becoming increasingly important in 
many MNEs, either in terms of strategic decision making, or actual product offering. If, as the 
empirical evidence provided in the next sections suggests, many MNEs are at least partially 
operating in cell 5 on a triad basis, then any strategy-related analysis of the MNE’s functioning first 
needs to take into account the requirement to decompose its strategic decision-making processes 
and product offering along global, regional and national lines, building upon a more complex 
analytical tool than a conventional integration-national responsiveness matrix. Only then can a 
correct analysis be performed of the actual extent of triad-based decision-making power and can the 





investigated. If the theoretical construct itself of a ‘regional solution’ (cell 5 in Figure 1) is 
neglected, little can be expected from empirical research on strategy and structure in MNEs to 
portray accurately the present importance and future potential of the regional approach.  
  Here, it is important to observe that the regional approach has sometimes been described as 
the mere outcome of a global strategy. The best known articulation of this perspective can be found 
in Yip (2003), who argues:  “Before deciding whether and how to do business in a region of the 
world, a company needs to have a clear global strategy [which includes] the core business strategy, 
the competitive objectives for the business, and the extent to which the business will be operated as 
one integrated business or a looser collection of geographically independent units. Next, a company 
needs to decide on the overall role of the region within the global strategy.” (p. 222). Yip’s (2003) 
view assumes a particular sequence and hierarchy in MNE strategic decision making. In practice, 
however, the global-regional sequence is unlikely to occur.  
The regional solution of cell 5 should be viewed as an efficient corporate response to several 
factors. First, internal information processing requirements are critical. If the ‘rules of engagement’ 
are different in each region (different industry structure, different regulatory system, different 
competitive position of the firm, different optimal expansion pattern, different product scope, 
different strategy tools required to outperform rivals etc.) intra-regional information processing 
must be sufficiently dense so as to permit affiliates to cope optimally with shared external 
circumstances and to develop regionally consistent strategies. Second, customer requirements may 
vastly differ across regions depending upon the level of economic development, culturally 
determined preferences, etc. Third, region-based cluster requirements may impose specific types of 
behavior on firms in order for these firms to be perceived as legitimate within the context of 





infrastructure etc. Here, region-based isomorphic flexibility may be critical for firms to function 
effectively as true insiders in the region. Finally, political and related institutional requirements at 
the regional level are increasingly important. It could be argued that regional cooperation 
agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Union 
(EU) single market measures mainly represent the elimination of trade and investment barriers, and 
therefore allow a reduced attention devoted by MNEs to government policy; in fact, regional 
agreements usually imply not merely the elimination of national regulation, but a shift of regulatory 
authority to the regional level, and thereby the need to allocate firm resources to monitor and 
manage relationships at that level.  
  The rigidity of the triad has been explored in Rugman (2000). It is reinforced by the new 
trade regime of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which has to devote enormous managerial 
resources to arbitrate triad-based trade disputes and trade-remedy law type protectionism (as in the 
bananas, beef hormones, export subsidies and steel cases). The new protectionism of health, safety 
and environmental regulations is preventing an open world market and reinforcing triad markets. 
The NAFTA is being expanded into the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) and several 
countries are in negotiations to be added to the EU. These political developments reinforce the triad 
and the need for regional government policies and triad-based firm strategies. 
 
Empirical Evidence on Triad Activity 
As a test of the limits to globalization, let us consider the most likely instance where a globally 
balanced distribution of sales, as a proxy for global corporate success, can be expected. Here, we 
could classify as ‘global’ all MNEs with a foreign-to-total sales (F/T) ratio above, say, 50% and/or 





performed one such test, building upon data from the Fortune Global 500 companies, i.e., the 
largest companies in the world, according to market size, see Rugman and Verbeke (2004). In that 
paper, we found that 320 of the 380 firms for which data were available, were home-region 
oriented, with over 50% of their sales in their home region. Twenty-five firms were found to be bi-
regional, with less than 50% of sales intra-regionally and over 20% of sales in two regions, 
including their own home regions. Another 11 firms were uni-regional in a host region, deriving 
over 50% of their sales in foreign regions. Only 9 firms in the set were global, with less than 50% of 
sales in their home region and over 20% of sales in each region of the triad. There was insufficient 
information to classify 15 firms.  
In this paper, we use a different, but perhaps even more relevant data set. The UNCTAD 
World Investment Report for 2001 reports the (F/T) ratios for sales, assets and employees on an 
annual basis for the world’s largest 100 MNEs, ranked by foreign assets. In other words, these are 
the firms that are the most internationalized, in terms of foreign activities, and they are also the ones 
most likely, from a supply side perspective, to have the necessary knowledge base and managerial 
capabilities to penetrate successfully foreign markets. For these 100 MNEs, we then calculate the 
(F/T) sales ratios for firms that are also included in the Fortune Global 500 to omit firms with less 
than $ 10 billion in sales. Foreign sales, as calculated by UNCTAD, include both sales by 
subsidiaries and exports by the parent MNE. The top 20 MNEs ranked by foreign-to-total sales ratio 
are reported in Table 1, as (F/T) sales.  
Table 1 here 
  The 20 MNEs are mostly from small, open economies such as Canada, Australia and 





There are no U.S. MNEs in this set of the most internationalized firms—which is not all that 
surprising given the huge size of the U.S. home market.  
  Yet, Table 1 disguises a very important point. While these 20 MNEs have the majority of 
their sales outside of the home country, many are still very regional. Most of their foreign sales are 
still mainly in their home-triad regional market. This point is demonstrated in Table 2, where MNEs 
are ranked according to their intra-regional sales percentages. By intra-regional is meant sales 
within Europe (and usually within the 15 member states of the E.U.) for MNEs from those countries 
and within NAFTA (for Canadian and U.S.) MNEs. In the case of Asian-Pacific MNEs, intra-
regional refers to Asia and the Pacific including Australia. The result of this home-triad region 
ranking is shown in Table 2. 
Table 2 here 
  The data in Table 2 reveal that nine of the 20 of the world’s allegedly most global MNEs 
are, in fact, operating mainly in their home-triad region market. For example the European MNEs, 
Suez (74% intra-regional sales); Vodafone (93.1%); and Stora Enso (69.2%) are clearly ‘European’ 
MNEs in their sales, as over two thirds of their business is within Europe. The same is true for 
several other MNEs that are allegedly global; in fact these MNEs are operating in their home-base 
triad region for the majority of their sales: ABB (53.9%); Nortel Networks (54.4%); Volvo (51.6%); 
BHP Billiton (66.1%); TotalFinaElf (74.0%) and Danone Groupe (60.3%). This leaves only 11 of 
the top 20 as MNEs that might achieve global competitive success.  
Of these, two are highly focused in one part of the triad, but not their home triad region. These 
include non-US MNEs with high sales in the United States, such as: 
•  Newscorp (9% sales in Australasia, 75.0% in the United States and 16.0% in the United 





•  AstraZeneca (32% in Europe; 52.8% in the United States and 5.2% in Japan and 10% in the 
rest of the world)  
Six firms are bi-regional MNEs with a significant portion (more than 20%) of their sales in two 
parts of the triad, but less than 50% in any one region. These are:  
•  Roche (38.6% in North America; 36.8% in Europe, only 11.7% in Asia Pacific and 12.9% in 
other regions) 
•  GlaxoSmithKline (49.2% in the United States; 28.6% in Europe and 22.2% in the rest of the 
world) 
•  Diageo (31.8% in Europe; 49.9% in North America, only 7.7% in Asia-Pacific and 11.6% in 
the rest of the world) 
•  Lafarge (40% in Europe; 32% in North America, only 8% in Asia-Pacific and the remaining 
20% in other parts of the world) 
•  British Petroleum (BP) (48.1% in North America; 36.3% in Europe and 15.6% in the rest of 
the world) 
•  L.M. Ericsson (46.0% in Europe, the Middle East and Africa; 25.9% in Asia Pacific, only 
13.2% in North America and 15.9% in the rest of the world.  
 
There are only three (out of 20) MNEs with a truly balanced distribution of sales, i.e., across all 
three regions of the triad (or even wider): 
•  Nokia (25.0% in the Americas, 49.0% in Europe, 26.0% in Asia-Pacific) 
•  Philips Electronics (28.7% in the U.S. and Canada, 43% in Europe, 21.5% in Asia-Pacific 





•  LVMH (26% in the United States, 36% in Europe, 32% in Asia-Pacific and 6% in the rest of 
the world.  
 
Yet, in spite of having achieved some demonstrated level of global corporate success, it should be 
recognized that these three companies are not cell 1 companies in Figure 1, as they exhibit some 
regional features in corporate strategy and structure. The other companies in the top-20 are either 
strongly home-triad region based or are from small countries peripheral to the triad and focused on 
one of the other triad markets. Most of the other 80 of the top 100 MNEs are even less global and 
are either domestic or home-region based MNEs.  
  One possible modification to this message on the limits to globalization is that, for some 
MNEs, the strategy may need to be adjusted by Strategic Business Unit (SBU). Unfortunately, it is 
difficult to find data on SBU sales, by triad region, for the UNCTAD 100 largest TNCs.  
  The large retail organizations are even more home-region based than the manufacturing 
MNEs. The large U.S. retailers like Wal-Mart, Sears and K-Mart are all North American based. The 
latter two have no stores outside the United States, and Wal-Mart only has 10% of its stores and 6% 
of its revenues outside of the NAFTA region. Wal-Mart has 4,414 stores of which 3,244 are in the 
United States, 196 are in Canada and 551 are in Mexico. Only 423 are in international markets, i.e. 
9.6% of the total stores. Nonetheless, Wal-Mart is the most international large-scale retailer from 
the United States. In 2001, foreign sales as a percentage of total sales were 16.26% ($35.4 billion of 
a total of $217.7 billion). But 94% of its sales are in NAFTA. Carrefour of France has about 9,200 
stores in 30 countries. Yet, only 19% of Carrefour's revenues originate from outside of Europe. 
Clearly Carrefour needs to be analyzed on a European, regional level; it is not an organization that 





Turning to financial services, the world’s largest financial MNE, Citigroup is also very 
regional. Citigroup’s consumer banking group has 72.7% of total revenues in North America, 
Accounts are 77.1% and only Deposits are more diversified, at 45.5%. Credit cards are part of the 
Accounts in Citigroup’s consumer banking group and over 76% of accounts in the United States are 
credit card accounts. While over 70% of Citigroup’s revenue and accounts are in the United States, 
only 45% of average consumer deposits are there. This regionalization is common across all the 
major business groups of Citigroup, except in commercial loans, which is only 27% U.S. based. 
While Citigroup has large commercial loans to foreign companies it is not as active in foreign 
consumer loans, as 65.6% of consumer loans are in the United States. Overall, these data reveal a 
strongly home-based, North American business. Indeed, Citibank became less global after the 
merger with Travellers in 1999, as the latter’s insurance business was very localized, and this offset 
much of Citibank’s banking diversification in South America and Asia. 
 
Examples of MNE positioning in the Regional Matrix 
In this section, we position 12 high profile MNEs often described as global firms by the media, in 
Figure 1, on the basis of the prime locus of decision-making power and the main geographic 
adaptation level of products. More specifically, we discuss sequentially six sets of two firms, with 
their main business in one particular industry (pharmaceuticals, branded packaged goods, 
cosmetics, cigarettes, cars, retail). This positioning, which is performed for illustrative purposes 
only, to describe the heterogeneity in so-called global MNE strategies results from surveying 
publicly available information, as well as ongoing research on these companies by the authors. The 
positioning of complex institutions such as these highly internationalized MNEs in a single cell of a 





‘at the margin’ the differences among the firms discussed, and thereby the variety in so-called 
global strategies. 
AstraZeneca can be placed in cell 5, as it has mainly regional corporate governance and 
distribution systems (the U.S. market is so important that it is now run separately from Europe). On 
the other hand, Merck is in cell 2 with strong corporate headquarters despite needing to operate 
regionally in Europe as well as in the U.S. home market as far as strategy implementation is 
concerned. Merck is experiencing some tension in this structure and does not perform as well in 
Europe as AstraZeneca does in the United States. 
  Nestlé manufactures food products that are nationally regulated and supervised by country 
health and safety codes. Thus, it needs to be aligned to local markets. Nestlé’s decision-making is 
largely in the hands of national units (cell 9), whereas Kraft functions mainly through regional 
centres (cell 6). Kraft’s product delivery and marketing are operated locally but ‘back office’ 
functions such as human resources management, accounting, auditing, legal and treasury services 
are performed in a more centralized and co-coordinated fashion. Some production is also co-
coordinated globally. Kraft has key decision making concentrated at regional centres in North 
America and International (largely Europe) through co-CEOs. 
L’Oréal is in cell 5, as its U.S. operations are administered by a regional office, to match its 
home European one. It has adapted its product lines for North America, e.g. Maybelline, which is 
controlled from New York, and is more mass marketing oriented than a number of its high-end 
French based cosmetics. L’Oréal says that its products are “culturally diverse global cosmetics 
brands”. Estée Lauder is more centralized, and positioned in cell 1, with both dominant corporate 





  Philip Morris is also positioned in cell 1, with strong corporate headquarters, and building 
upon global brands, Marlboro in particular, which are not adapted locally. It does not need to be 
particularly concerned with regulations in other countries as its main problem is class action 
litigation in its U.S. home market. British owned BAT can be positioned in cell 5, as it runs its U.S. 
operations with a large degree of autonomy through B&W, as a regional centre. It also has regional 
brands rather than the global ones of Philip Morris. 
Toyota has a strongly centralized, hierarchical organizational structure. This is based on 
Kiichriro Toyoda’s “the Toyota way” of consensus decision making and discipline. Yet Toyota’s 
product characteristics are much more region based, especially with adaptation in the vital U.S. host 
market, thereby positioning the firm largely in cell 2. In contrast, Hyundai, which has equally 
centralized decision-making, does not to the same extent adapt products to regional markets, i.e. it is 
closer to cell 1. 
  Finally, Wal-Mart and Carrefour can both be positioned in cell 3 of Figure 1. Both have 
centralized decision making, and both sell mainly in their home markets. Carrefour may be moving 
toward cell 2, but there is, as yet, little evidence to support such regional adaptation of its 
production and services. 
  The examples above are consistent with similar analyses performed for many of the Fortune 
Global 500 companies, see Rugman (2005). Of the 380 firms with data on geographic sales, as 
many as 320 have an average of 80% of their sales in their home region of the triad. Here, the 
regional level, as introduced by Figure 1, both on the horizontal axis and the vertical axis, appears 
important to many of them. The figure can also be used to position the handful of truly ‘global’ 
MNEs and the ‘bi-regional’ MNEs. The twelve examples discussed above illustrate the alignment 







There is abundant empirical support for the proposition that many large, and highly 
internationalized MNEs have regional components in their strategy formation, both as regards the 
locus of decision-making, and the geographic adaptation level of their products. The world’s 100 
most international MNEs are mainly triad-based regional players, not global ones. They operate on 
a strongly segmented triad/regional basis, and a relevant framework to analyze MNE strategy needs 
to recognize this. In short, management strategy as taught in business schools today should focus 
increasingly on the empirical reality that many firms lack a balanced distribution of sales around the 
globe, but are often focused on their home region. In addition, even firms with widely dispersed 
sales often have regional components in their strategy. Public policy towards MNEs also needs to 







Figure 1  
A Framework for Analysing “Globalisation”
Locus of decision making power on 




































Table 1: The World's Most International MNEs 
 
 
   Corporation  Home Country  F/T 
         2001 
           
1  Nokia  Finland         98.5  
2  Roche   Switzerland         98.2  
3  ABB  Switzerland         97.4  
4  Philips Electronics  Netherlands         95.2  
5  Nortel Networks  Canada         94.6  
6  Stora Enso  Finland         94.3  
7  AstraZeneca  UK         94.1  
8  Volvo  Sweden         92.8  
9  GlaxoSmithKline  UK         92.0  
10  News Corp.  Australia         92.0  
11  Diageo  UK         85.8  
12  Lafarge  France         85.8  
13  BHP Billiton  Australia         83.4  
14  LVMH  France         81.2  
15  BP  UK         80.5  
16  TotalFinaElf  France         79.1  
17  Suez  France         78.8  
18  Ericsson  Sweden         77.8  
19  Danone Groupe  France         76.7  
20  Vodafone  UK         75.1  
           
      
 
Note:  This table is constructed from the UNCTAD (2001) source which lists the world’s largest 100 MNEs by foreign 
asset size. The foreign and total sales of these 100 MNEs are also reported so (F/T) sales ratios can be calculated. Then 
the top 20 MNEs on (F/T) sales that are also listed as a top 500 firm by Fortune, The Fortune Global 500, 2002, are 
included in this table. Five firms in the top 20 UNCTAD list, were not sufficiently large in terms of revenues to be 
included in The Fortune Global 500 list. These firms are: NTL Inc., Thomson, WPP Group (whose revenues were 
confirmed to be below 10 million in the Annual Report), Holcim and Pearson.  
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Table 2: Home Region distribution of sales of the world's TNC index, 2001 
 
   500  Corporation  Home Country  intra-regional  NA 
   EUR 
   AP 
    C  
   Rank        2001*  (%) 
   (%) 
   (%) 
     
            
     
     
     
1  147  Nokia  Finland               49.0         25.0 
 l       49.0 
      26.0 
   G  
2  288  Roche   Switzerland               36.8         38.6 
      36.8 
      11.7 
   B  
3  194  ABB  Switzerland               53.9         25.1 
      53.9 
      11.3 
   D  
4  143  Philips Electronics  Netherlands               43.0         28.7 
 a       43.0 
      21.5 
   G  
5  263  Nortel Networks  Canada               54.4         54.4 
 a    na 
   na 
   D  
6  423  Stora Enso  Finland               69.2         19.5 
      69.2 
        7.1 
   D  
7  301  AstraZeneca  UK               32.0         52.8 
 z       32.0 
        5.2 
 j    S  
8  267  Volvo  Sweden               51.6         30.2 
      51.6 
        6.0 
   D  
9  140  GlaxoSmithKline  UK               28.6         49.2 
 z       28.6 
   na 
   B  
10  364  News Corp.  Australia                 9.0         75.0 
 z       16.0 
 u         9.0 
   S  
11  262  Diageo  UK               31.8         49.9 
      31.8 
        7.7 
   B  
12  416  Lafarge  France               40.0         32.0 
      40.0 
        8.0 
   B  
13  281  BHP Billiton  Australia               66.1         12.6 
      13.0 
      66.1 
   D  
14  459  LVMH  France               36.0         26.0 
 z       36.0 
      32.0 
   G  
15  4  BP  UK               36.3         48.1 
      36.3 
   na 
   B  
16  15  TotalFinaElf  France               55.6           8.4 
      55.6 
   na 
   D  
17  99  Suez  France               74.0         11.0 
      74.0 
        5.0 
   D  
18  210  Ericsson  Sweden               46.0         13.2 
      46.0 
 m       25.9 
   B  
19  394  Danone Groupe  France               60.3    na 
      60.3 
   na 
   D  
20  123  Vodafone  UK               93.1           0.1 
 z       93.1 
        4.8 
   D  
                 
     
     
     
 
Sources: Individual Annual Reports.  
Note:  This table is constructed from the UNCTAD (2001) source which lists the world’s largest 100 MNEs by foreign asset size. The foreign and total sales of 
these 100 MNEs are also reported so (F/T) sales ratios can be calculated. Then the top 20 MNEs on (F/T) sales that are also listed as a top 500 firm by Fortune, 
The Fortune Global 500, 2002, are included in this table. a. Canada and the U.S.; z. U.S. only; l. Americas; u. UK only; m. Europe, the Middle East and Africa; j. 
Japan. G. Global; B. Biregional; D. Home-region oriented; S. Host-region oriented.  
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